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Stepparents as Third Parties in Relation
to Their Stepchildren
MARGARET M. MAHONEY*

I. Stepparents as Third Parties
The "third parties" who inspired this symposium are categories of
adults who form de facto family ties with children to whom they do not
stand in the relationship of legal parent. In the eyes of the law, the status
of parenthood is generally restricted to biological and adoptive parents.
Within this frame of reference, stepparents constitute a major category of
"third parties" who develop relationships with their stepchildren but are
not regarded as legal parents.
A residential stepparent-stepchild relationship is created when the custodial parent of a minor child marries another adult who is not the child's
biological or adoptive parent. By virtue of the stepparent's marriage to the
child's custodial parent, the elaborate status of marriage is established at
law between the two adults' who thereafter share a home with the child.
The question treated here is whether any legal significance attaches as
well to the relationship between the stepparent and the stepchild in these
circumstances.
The question of legal recognition for stepparent-child relationships
may arise while the stepfamily members reside together as a family unit,
or in the event that the marriage between the stepparent and the custodial
parent is terminated by divorce or death. Inevitably, the recognition of
* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. The author is indebted to her research assistant, Katie Voye, for assistance in preparing this article.
1. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955-57 (Mass. 2003) (cataloguing the numerous legal consequences of marriage); David L. Chambers, What If? The Legal
Consequences of Marriageand the Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH.
L. REV. 447 (1996) (same).
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residential stepparents as legally significant actors in the lives of their
stepchildren in any of these circumstances would require some adjustment
to the boundaries of family established in the law.
Both stepfamilies and the broad question of legal recognition for them
have a long history. For example, a treatise titled The Stepfather in the
Family,2 published in 1940, collected cases in the United States involving
the financial rights and obligations of stepfathers dating back to the first
half of the nineteenth century. 3 In more recent decades, the number of
stepfamilies in the United States has increased dramatically, due to the
increased numbers of never-before-married mothers who marry men other
than the fathers of their children and custodial parents who remarry following a divorce. During this same period, the level of demand for legal
recognition of rights and duties between stepfamily members has risen,
with scholars documenting and analyzing the resulting legal developments.4
In spite of the long history of stepfamily issues in the legal arena, and
the increased demand for regulation in recent decades, little progress has
been made in establishing a clear or consistent legal definition of the stepparent status. The state of the law in this area and the reasons for the slow
development of a legal status for stepparents are discussed at length in
Parts III through VI of this article. Prior to that discussion, Part II presents
demographic information about stepfamilies in the United States, derived
from the 2000 census, and explores the meaning of the term "stepparent"
in the census survey and in the law.
II. Census Data and Definitions
The most recent demographic information about stepfamilies is based
on data collected by the U.S. Census Bureau in the 2000 census. The Census
Bureau reported a total of 4.4 million "stepchildren of householders" in
the United States in 2000; 3.3 million of these stepchildren were under
2. ADELE STUART MERIAM, THE STEPFATHER IN THE FAMILY (1940).
3. See id. at 23-26 (discussing early cases invoking the in loco parentis doctrine as a basis
for imposing stepfather support duties).
4. See MARGARET M. MAHONEY, STEPFAMILIES AND THE LAW (1994); David L. Chambers,
Stepparents, Biologic Parents, and the Law's Perceptions of "Family" after Divorce, in
DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 102 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds.,

1990); Mary Ann Mason, The Modern American Stepfamily: Problems and Possibilities,in ALL
OUR FAMILIES 95 (Mary Ann Mason et al. eds., 1998); Mary Ann Mason & Nicole Zayac,
Rethinking Stepparent Rights: Has the ALl Found a Better Definition?, 36 FAM. L.Q. 227
(2002). At the same time, stepfamilies have become the subject of numerous empirical studies
describing the behavior and attitudes of family members. See Chambers, supra, at 102-03
(describing dozens of empirical studies completed during the 1980s involving various aspects
of the relationships established within stepfamilies).
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eighteen years of age.5 The "stepchildren of householders" represented
approximately five percent of all "children of householders" counted by the
Census Bureau.6
The number of stepchildren reported here is underinclusive in one
sense, because the number includes "stepchildren of the householder" but
omits stepchildren of the householder's spouse living in their home. The
census questionnaire required one adult in each surveyed household to
designate himself or herself as the "householder." All children in the
home were then described by their relationship to the householder. Thus,
if the biological parent was designated as the householder in a residential
stepfamily, the stepchildren were designated as "biological children" of
the householder, and the fact that the householder's spouse was not the
second biological parent was not revealed.7 Notably, the Census Bureau
conducted a smaller survey of children in 1996, which did not suffer from
the "householder" status limitation on counting stepchildren. This earlier
survey estimated that 4.9 million children under age eighteen were living
with a stepparent, 8 a number significantly higher than the 3.3 million minor
stepchildren of the householder reflected in the millennial census figures.
Another definitional issue emerged in reporting the millennial census
data about stepfamilies. According to the Census Bureau report, "[t]hese
data reflect the changing usage of the terms "stepchild" and "stepfamily,"
since they show that some householders considered themselves to be stepparents even though they were not married to the biological parent of the
child in their household." 9 This conclusion was reached by looking to the
information provided by householders, who claimed to reside with their
"stepchildren," about their past and present marriage or domestic partnership status. Although the majority of self-designated "stepparents" were
living with a spouse, some of them had never been married.'" This more
expansive definition of stepparent, which includes the unmarried partner
5. See ROSE M. KREIDER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2000 SPECIAL REPORTS, ADOPTED
CHILDREN AND STEPCHILDREN: 2000 (Oct. 2003), 2 table 1.
6. Id. (reporting 83,714,107 total children of householders, and 64,651,959 children of
householders under age eighteen).
7. Id. at 21. ("Some of the children who are listed in this report as biological children of
the householder may also be the stepchildren of the spouse of the householder ....")
8. See JASON FIELDS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC STUDIES, LIVING
ARRANGEMENTS OF CHILDREN: 1996 (Apr. 2001), 2. See also Stepfamily Association of
America, U.S. Stepfamily Fact Sheet, available at http://www.saafamilies.org//faqs/index.htm
(summarizing 1990 data regarding children living in married-couple households in the United
States, which indicated that 11.7 percent of the children resided with a stepparent).
9. KREIDER, supra note 5, at 20.
10. Id. at 19-20.
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of a custodial parent, has not been widely implemented in the discussion
of legal issues involving stepfamilies. 1
A final definitional aspect of the information about stepfamilies collected
and reported by the Census Bureau is the exclusion of all nonresidential
stepparent-child relationships. That is, the child of parents who did not
reside together was counted just once, as a member of the household
where the child spent the most time. The same child was not counted as a
biological child or stepchild in the household of his or her noncustodial
parent. According to the government report summarizing the census data
about children, "[n]ationally representative surveys do not generally collect information about the relationship between household members and
nonresident parents." 12 This limitation is consistent with the commonly
employed definitions of stepparent and stepchild in the law. 3
III. Numerous Factors Have Slowed the
Development of a Legal Status for Stepparents
The legal status of parenthood entails numerous rights and obligations,
including custodial rights and financial obligations. Parent-child relationships are regulated in this manner to recognize and strengthen the family
unit and protect dependent family members. Under the traditional model
of parenthood and family, this important family status is limited to the categories of biological and adoptive parents and excludes stepparents who
marry the custodial parents of minor children. Over time, stepfamily
members have sought recognition in many of the legal settings where
family relationships matter. Claimants maintain that the recognition of
stepparenthood as a legal status is necessary to accomplish the general
goals of the family law system, regarding protection and support for the
family unit and its members, as to the large category of stepfamilies.
The recurring legal issues, governed by the statutes and case law of
each state, include the custodial authority of the stepparent while married
to the custodial parent of a minor stepchild, stepparent custody or visitation
rights following termination of the marriage, the support responsibility of
the stepparent during marriage and following divorce, and stepchild rights
to inherit from the stepparent who dies without a will. Additional questions have arisen about the status of stepparents in other legal settings,
11. But see UNIF. ADOPTION AcT (1994) § 4-102(b) cmt. (recognizing the "de facto stepparent," who is not married to the child's custodial parent, as a "de jure stepparent" with standing to file a stepparent adoption petition).
12. KREIDER, supra note 5, at 21.
13. See, e.g., Van Dyke v. Thompson, 630 P.2d 420 (Wash. 1981) (excluding nonresidential stepparents from coverage under the state statute creating stepparent support obligations).
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such as criminal and tort law and social benefit programs, which are
beyond the scope of this article.' n
The starting premise under the traditional model of parenthood and
family is that claims for legal recognition of the stepparent-child relationship will be denied. The current "law of stepfamilies" consists of a
series of limited exceptions, created by the state legislatures and courts,
which recognize the stepparent status for a single purpose in the law.
Notably, the rules establishing limited recognition in this manner for stepparents as third parties are not uniform from one state to another.
The law of stepparent adoption is an important dimension of the legal
regulation of stepfamilies. The adoption laws in every state create a procedure for moving the residential stepparent from the status of third-party
adult into the status of legal parent with full parental rights and obligations
vis-A-vis the adopted stepchild. The adoptive status, established by court
order, is available only if the parental status of the child's noncustodial
parent has been legally terminated.
The explanation for the continuing failure of the state courts and legislatures to define a clear and consistent legal status for residential, nonadoptive stepparents has several elements. First and foremost, as
described in Part IV, adherence to the traditional model of the family has
slowed the willingness of lawmakers to extend family recognition to stepparents and other third-party adults who serve as parent figures for minor
children. A more refined aspect of this first consideration, relating to protection for the status of noncustodial parents, is discussed in Part V.
Finally, Part VI describes the ways in which a perceived lack of uniformity among stepfamilies, in terms of the level of stepparent involvement
with stepchildren, has complicated the task of regulating them in the law.
The resulting "law of stepfamilies," which recognizes the stepparentchild relationship for limited purposes, is an essential element in the
description of family boundaries in United States law today.
IV. Adherence to the Traditional Family Model Has
Slowed the Development of a Legal Status for Stepparents
The comprehensive recognition of stepparenthood as a significant legal
status would require a change in the established model of family in the
14. See generally MAHONEY, supra note 4, at 75-100 (discussing the treatment of stepfamilies under various tort doctrines), 101-12 (wrongful death laws), 113-22 (worker compensation programs), 200-08 (criminal neglect and abuse laws), 217-30 (criminal incest laws); Mary
Ann Mason & David W. Simon, The Ambiguous Stepparent:Federal Legislation in Search of
a Model, 29 FAM. L.Q. 445 (1995) (discussing the treatment of stepfamilies under various federal programs).
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law. The traditional family model emphasizes biology and adoption as the
exclusive bases for establishing legally recognized adult-child relationships. 5 The nonadoptive residential stepparent is not a parent in this
sense, although he or she is married to the stepchild's custodial parent and
functions as the second adult in their home, possibly sharing de facto
responsibility for the child. The recognition of stepparenthood as a significant legal status would set aside the established principle that adult rights
and duties toward children arise exclusively via biology or adoption.
A California trial court highlighted this consideration in the case of
Halpern v. Halpern,16 in denying the visitation request of a stepfather who
had served as the primary caretaker of his young stepdaughter from the
time of her birth until his marital separation, stating:
I have to find the best interests of the child require there be no visitation
because [the stepfather] is a nonparent. He absolutely has no relationship to the
child bloodwise or otherwise .... This child was well under two years of age.
...
I can't accept I should burden all of the parties in this matter, including [the
17
stepfather], with conflicts, struggles and disruptions for years to come....
If the stepfather in Halpern had been the child's biological father, his
right to continuing access to the child would have been unquestioned. The
court expressly relied upon the absence of this biological connection in
reaching the opposite result for Mr. Halpern.
An additional and related challenge to the traditional family model arises in stepfamilies where the stepchild's second biological parent is present in the child's life. Here, the residential stepparent challenges the established assumption that the family model, premised on biology, has room
for only two parents or parent figures. 8 The legal recognition of a third
adult with rights and duties vis-A-vis the child would complicate the family picture, and might be experienced by the noncustodial parent as a dilution of his or her role. Professor Mary Ann Mason has observed that
"[m]ultiple parenting is ...one of the reasons that there has been no con' 9
sistent effort to reformulate the role of stepparents."'
15. See Katherine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthoodas an Exclusive Status: The Needfor
Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed,70 VA. L. REV. 879,
886-93 (1984) (discussing "[t]he [1]egal and [t]heoretical [b]ackground of [e]xclusive [p]arenthood").
16. Halpern v. Halpern, 184 Cal. Rptr. 740 (Ct. App. 1982).
17. Id. at 747 (quoting portions of the trial court opinion).
18. See Bartlett, supra note 15, at 944-61 (discussing legal models that would recognize
multiple parents).
19. Mason, supra note 4, at 109-10. See also Chambers, supra note 4, at 110 ("In most
[legal] contexts ... , the recognition of the stepparent relationship costs someone something and
someone feels like a loser.").
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The opinion of the Halpern court, quoted above, referred to potential
"conflicts, struggles and disruptions for years to come" as a basis for denying stepparent visitation rights following divorce. In the case of biological
parents who divorce, the potential for future disagreement does not deter
the entry of enforceable custody and visitation orders. As to stepparents
such as Mr. Halpern, on the other hand, judicial concerns about additional
complications in the postdivorce family may result in the denial of visitation
claims, especially when a court has already established enforceable visitation rights for the noncustodial biological parent.
The same concern about "multiple parents" is reflected in the laws allocating the legal decision-making authority for stepchildren who reside
with a custodial parent and stepparent. As a starting premise, the authority
to make decisions about a child's well-being, in areas such as education,
religious training, and medical care, is shared by the child's biological
parents. In the event of divorce, the divorce decree would allocate legal
(decision-making) custody between the parents. Between never-married
parents who do not live together, the issue of custodial responsibility may be
addressed by their informal agreement or by court order. If the divorced
or never-married parent with primary physical custody of the child subsequently marries, a question arises about the new stepparent's role as another
"voice of authority" for the child.2 °
As a practical matter, the members of each stepfamily define the scope
of stepparent authority within their household, as to matters such as children's schedules and discipline. Furthermore, the stepparent inevitably
shares major aspects of the custodial parent's decision-making authority
when the couple makes major household decisions, such as where the
family will reside and what food they will eat. However, a more formal
definition of the lines of authority becomes necessary when individuals
who deal with children outside the home, such as educators and medical
practitioners, enter the picture. These parties look to the adults who have
clear legal authority to make decisions for the children.
In the medical field, where practitioners must obtain the patient's
informed consent to most medical procedures, the consent of a parent or
other authorized adult is usually required before a child can be treated.
Common law and statutory rules in every state authorize the child's legal
custodian or guardian, typically the parent or both parents in the case of
joint legal custody, for this purpose." Under these laws, "[s]tepparents in
most states have no.. . authority to give legally effective consent to med20. See MAHONEY, supra note 4, at 124-29 (discussing custodial authority of residential
stepparents); Mason, supra note 4, at 111.
21. See FAY A. ROZOVSKY, CONSENT TO TREATMENT § 5.1, § 5.2, at 5:3 (3d ed. 2000).
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22
ical treatment for their minor stepchildren.
The identity of the adult(s) with decision-making authority is important
as well to educators who must defer to parents on matters affecting the
education of their children. Parents make decisions, for example, about
the child's enrollment in a particular school or program and the release of
student records. 23 Stepparents are generally excluded from the laws that
establish adult authority as to these matters. 24 Their limited recognition in
school settings then depends largely upon the policies adopted by schools
and educators, such as a policy that would allow the stepparent to pick up
the child after school upon written consent of the custodial parent.25
The absence of legal standing for residential stepparents in these settings
reflects the underlying aversion to "multiple parents" in the law. From the
perspective of the medical practitioner or educator, a model that gives a
voice to one or two biological parents limits the potential for conflicting
messages from additional authority figures, and the need to identify them
in the first place. This simple model, however, imposes a burden on stepfamilies in which the stepparent has assumed an active parenting role,
because a costly gap is created between the reality of family life and the
recognition extended to the family by other parties who deal with the children. In the eyes of the law, this model is the norm, based on the traditional definitions of family and parenthood.

V. Protection for the Rights of Noncustodial Parents
Limits the Legal Recognition of Stepparents
In cases where a child's biological parents do not reside together and
the child lives primarily with one of them, both maintain their rights as
parents unless a court order terminates the legal status of the noncustodial
22. MAHONEY, supra note 4, at 126. Some state medical consent statutes include broader
provisions that authorize the stepparent to consent to medical treatment for the stepchild. For
example, the Missouri statute expressly defines "parent" to include "stepparent." See Mo. REV.
STAT. § 431.061 (2000). Other state statutes extend authority to consent to the treatment of a
minor to any person standing in loco parentis vis-A-vis the child, a category that includes many
residential stepparents. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-9-602 (2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-92(a)(4) (2001). In other jurisdictions, the person standing in loco parentis is authorized to give
consent only if the child's parent is unavailable. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-133
(2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.53(A)(9) (2001); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 129.040
(LexisNexis 2004).
23. See KERN ALEXANDER & M. DAVID ALEXANDER, THE LAW OF SCHOOLS, STUDENTS AND
TEACHERS IN A NUTSHELL §§ 1.5 (school selection), § 13.2 (student records) (3d ed. 2003).
24. See MAHONEY, supra note 4, at 128-29.
25. See Ronald L. Stenger, The School Counselorand the Law: New Developments, 15 J.L.
& EDUC. 105, 111 (1986). See generally Donald S. Punger, The NontraditionalFamily: Legal
Problemsfor Schools, 15 SCH. L. BULL., Apr. 1984, at 1(describing various school policies and
their impact on the members of nontraditional families).
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parent. The noncustodial parent owes support to the child and is entitled
to remain involved in the child's life. When a stepparent marries the custodial parent and thereafter resides with the child, certain legal issues may
arise that place the interests of the stepparent and the noncustodial parent
vis-h-vis the child in direct conflict. Of course, these disputes inevitably
involve the interests of other family members, especially the child and the
custodial parent.
The issue of stepparent adoption highlights in the starkest fashion the
potential conflict between claims of the residential stepparent and the
interests of the child's noncustodial parent.26 On the one hand, an adoption operates to formalize de facto connections already established within
the stepfamily, by designating the stepparent as the child's legal parent for
all purposes. On the other hand, the stepparent is able to adopt only after
the noncustodial parent has been removed from the status of legal parent
by consent, court order, or death.
As a procedural matter, the stepparent initiates an adoption proceeding
by filing a petition with the adoption court.2 ' The participation of the child's
custodial parent (the spouse of the stepparent) is generally required, in the
form of written consent to the proposed adoption. 28 State adoption statutes
generally waive, as to the spouse of the petitioning stepparent, the general
requirement that all rights of both biological parents must be terminated
prior to an adoption. 29 The child's consent is also required, if the child has
26. Another category of cases that places the stepparent in direct competition with the noncustodial parent involves custody disputes arising upon the death of the custodial parent.
Professor David Chambers observed that judges deciding these cases "face much the same ineffable choices that they do in the context of disputed stepparent adoptions ....
The incoherent
pattern of outcomes and the murky and inconsistent discussions of the governing rules almost
certainly reflect our society's conflicting and unresolved attitudes about stepparents, even when
loving, and about biologic parents, even when indifferent." Chambers, supra note 4, at 122.
The contested stepchild name-change case may also be seen as a competition between the
noncustodial parent and the stepparent, although the stepparent is not usually a named party.
Name-change cases arise when stepfamily members (usually the custodial parent and the child)
seek to change the child's last name from that of the noncustodial parent (usually the father) to
the surname of the stepparent (the stepfather). As in the context of stepparent adoption, state law
doctrines governing these disputes vary in terms of the level of protection established for the
respective interests involved. See MAHONEY, supra note 4, at 149-59; Merle H. Weiner, "We
Are Family:" Valuing Associationalismin Disputes over Children'sSurnames, 75 N.C. L. REV.
1625, 1690-1752 (1997). See generally Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Rights and Remedies of
ParentsInter Se with Respect to the Names of Their Children, 40 A.L.R. 5th 697 (1996 & Supp.
2005) (collecting cases).
27. See, e.g., UNIF. ADOPTION Act, supra note 11, at § 4-108.
28. See, e.g., id. at § 4-105 (requiring consent of petitioning stepparent's spouse).
29. See, e.g., id. at § 4-103(b)(1), 1 JOAN HEIFITZ HOLLINGER, ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 2.10[3], at 2-94 (2004).
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reached a certain age or level of maturity.3" Finally, the noncustodial parent
must receive notice of the adoption action3' and may either consent or
object to the adoption.
The noncustodial parent who objects to a proposed stepparent adoption
is seeking to protect his or her own legal relationship with the child with
all of the benefits and obligations for both parent and child associated with
this status. Generally speaking, this relationship is entitled to legal protection as a matter of state policy and constitutional law.32 The stepparent
adoption laws must balance this important set of interests against the competing interests of the child and other family members associated with formal recognition of the stepparent-child relationship.
The standard uniformly applied by the courts in ruling on stepparent
adoption petitions is the best interests of the child.3 3 Before the court
reaches this point in the analysis of a contested stepparent adoption case,
however, the court must address the status of the noncustodial parent who
is objecting to the adoption. Statutes in every state set out standards pursuant to which the parent's consent to adoption can be waived, and his or
her parental rights terminated by the court. 34 If the state standard for waiving parental consent is met in a stepparent adoption case, then the court
may proceed to consider the merits of the adoption petition.
The statutory standards governing the waiver of parental consent to
adoption vary from state to state in ways that establish varying levels of
protection for the biological parent-child relationship. While the variation
in statutory standards is significant, the results in many stepparent adoption cases are also shaped by the enormous amount of discretion exercised
by judges in construing and applying these statutes in individual cases. As
30. See, e.g., UNIF. ADOPTION ACT, supra note 11, at § 2-401(c) (establishing age twelve as
the age at which the child's consent to adoption is required).
31. See, e.g., id. at § 4-110(a).
32. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 7.3, at 439
(1997) ("The Supreme Court has recognized that parents have a fundamental right to the custody of their children."). The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the substantive constitutional
rights of parents in the context of a third-party visitation case in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S.
57 (2000).
33. See, e.g., UNIF. ADOPTION ACT, supra note 11 at § 3-703; 1 HOLLINGER, supra note 29,
§ 1.01[2][b], at 1-12.
34.

See JOHN DEWrrT GREGORY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW § 6.01[B][1] at 184

(2005) ("Termination of parental rights . . . is, like adoption, a creature of statute."); 1
HOLLINGER, supra note 29, app. I-A (collecting state statutes governing the waiver of parental
consent in adoption proceedings). The involuntary termination of parental rights may also occur
outside the adoption context, following intervention by the state to protect children in abusive
and neglectful families. The legislatures in some states have established a single set of statutory
termination standards to govern all cases; others have enacted specific provisions to govern
adoption cases. Id.
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in the legislative formulation of standards in this difficult field, there is no
consistent approach taken by the state courts to the task of balancing the
competing interests that arise in every contested stepparent adoption case.
A key variable in the state stepparent adoption statutes relates to the
scope of evidence that the court may consider in ruling on the status of the
noncustodial parent. Under the traditional legislative model, the court's
inquiry is limited to information regarding the nonconsenting parent's
past conduct.35 However, the statutory standards in some states deviate
from this model and allow the court to consider as well other evidence
relating to the child, including evidence about the child's existing placement in the stepfamily. 36 In cases where the additional information about
the stepfamily is positive, this broader inquiry may have a negative impact
on the court's determination about the status of the noncustodial parent.
The traditional standards governing waiver of consent by the noncustodial parent to a proposed stepparent adoption generally require a judicial determination that the parent intended to abandon the child, or is
"unfit" to continue in the status of legal parent. The relevant conduct often
involves the "failure to maintain contact with the child, to support the
child, or to otherwise carry out the responsibilities of parenthood over a
period of time."-37 Under this statutory model, the well-being of the child
apart from his or her relationship to the noncustodial parent becomes relevant only after an affirmative determination of parental unfitness, when
the court subsequently determines whether a stepparent adoption would
serve the child's best interests.
The Illinois case of In re Adoption of Syck 38 dramatically illustrates the
impact of limiting the evidence in this manner in the threshold determination about the status of the noncustodial parent. The Illinois statute
applied in this case permitted the waiver of consent if the parent was
"found by the court, by clear and convincing evidence, to be an unfit person."39 The adoption court found the noncustodial mother in Syck to be an
35. See I HOLLINGER, supra note 29, § 2.10[3], at 2-97 to -99.
36. See id. at 2-106 to -108.
37. MAHONEY, supra note 4, at 165. See also I HOLLINGER, supra note 29, § 2.10[3], at
2-97 to -99.
38. In re Adoption of Syck, 562 N.E.2d 174 (Il. 1990).
39. Id. at 183-84. The heightened evidentiary standard of "clear and convincing evidence"
in the Illinois statute applied in this case is a common feature of state statutes governing the
involuntary termination of parental rights, enacted in response to the ruling of the Supreme
Court in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (holding that the Due Process Clause
required the heightened standard in a case involving state-initiated termination of parental
rights). The heightened evidentiary standard establishes greater protection for the noncustodial
parent in stepparent adoption cases. See, e.g., In re I.R.D., 971 P.2d 702, 705 (1998) ("Because
the fundamental liberty interest of the parent in the relationship with the child is involved, the
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"unfit person" under this provision, and terminated her parental rights. An
intermediate appellate court affirmed. But the Illinois Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the lower courts had erroneously factored the
child's interest in being adopted into their analyses4 of the noncustodial
mother's status under the waiver of consent statute. 0
The legislative provisions in other states deviate from this traditional
model, and allow the courts making waiver of consent/termination decisions
to consider factors besides the past conduct of the noncustodial parent.41
The Uniform Adoption Act of 1994, which provides a model rule for enactment by the states, illustrates this alternative approach. The act would
require the court to find, "upon clear and convincing evidence," that the
noncustodial parent "failed to... make reasonable and consistent [support]
payments... [and failed to] communicate or visit regularly with the minor"
for a period of at least six months immediately preceding the adoption
petition; and would also require the court to find, "by a preponderance of
the evidence, that termination is in the best interests of the minor."4 2 This
broader standard would authorize the court to consider evidence about the
child's relationship with the noncustodial parent, as under the traditional
"fitness" inquiry, and would also enable the court to consider evidenceboth positive and negative-about the stepfamily. Under this model, the
same evidence might inform both the judicial decision to terminate the
rights of the noncustodial parent and the subsequent determination whether
a stepparent adoption would serve the child's best interests.43
clear and convincing evidentiary standard applies to parental rights terminations involved in
stepparent-initiated adoptions.").
40. Syck, 562 N.E.2d at 183.
41. See MAHONEY, supra note 4, at 169-77. See generally Annette R. Appell & Bruce A.
Boyer, ParentalRights vs. Best Interests of the Child: A False Dichotomy in the Context of
Adoption, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 63, 66 (1995) (criticizing "the replacement of traditional parent-focused standards for court intervention by a purportedly child-focused standard"
in the child welfare context).
42. UNIF. ADOPTION AcT, supra note II at § 3-504(c)(2) (governing cases involving children older than six months who have been residing with a parent). See also WASH. REv. CODE
ANN. § 26.33.120(1) (West 2005) ("[T]he parent-child relationship of a parent may be terminated upon a showing by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the
child to terminate the relationship and that the parent has failed to perform parental duties under
circumstances showing a substantial lack of regard for his or her parental obligations and is
withholding consent to adoption contrary to the best interest of the child.") (emphasis added).
43. The method used by the Colorado courts to resolve the dual issues of waiver of consent
and stepparent adoption guarantees that the adoption court will consider information about the
child's best interests in every case, even though the waiver of consent statute focuses, in the traditional manner, exclusively on parental conduct. The Colorado courts first consider whether a
proposed adoption is in the best interests of the child, an inquiry that typically involves full consideration of the child's relationships with all parties. The courts apply the waiver of consent
statute, which requires abandonment by the parent or the failure to provide support to the child

Stepparents as Third Partiesin Relation to Their Stepchildren

93

However broad or narrow the state statutory standard for dispensing
with parental consent to adoption, the courts exercise a great deal of discretion in construing and applying the state statutes in this field."
According to Professor Joan Hollinger, the variations in judicial interpretation of the parental consent statutes reflect differing approaches to the
task of balancing the competing interests in stepparent adoption cases.
Judicial interpretations of the statutory grounds for forfeiting consent vary
greatly. They seem to depend on how solicitous the court is of the interests of
the noncustodial parent, or alternatively, of the child's interest in securing legal
recognition of what is already likely to be a stable custodial household ....15

A prime example of the exercise of discretion involves the judicial con-

struction of language such as the "fail[ure] to communicate or visit regularly with the minor" provision of the Uniform Adoption Act, quoted
above. At one extreme, in a recent stepparent adoption case in Ohio, a single ten-minute accidental encounter by the noncustodial mother with her
child at the county fair preserved her right to prevent a proposed stepparent adoption. The trial court in this case, In re Vaughn," had determined
that the mother's consent to adoption should be waived under the Ohio

statute allowing such a waiver when "the parent has failed without justifiable case to communicate with the minor ...for a period of at least one
year." In reversing this decision, the appellate court stated that "we are
properly obliged to strictly construe [the state statute] to protect the interests of the nonconsenting parent who may be subjected to forfeiture or
abandonment of his or her parental rights."47 By way of contrast, other

state courts have ruled that such "incidental contact" by the noncustodial
parent does not constitute the "visitation or communication with the
child" required to preserve the parent's rights."
An additional element of judicial discretion in these cases is the authority of the adoption court to preserve the status of the noncustodial parent,
for one year, only in cases where an affirmative determination has been made on the threshold
question of the child's best interests. See In re R.H.N., 710 P.2d 782, 785 (Colo. 1985) (applying Colorado waiver of consent statute currently codified at COLO. REV.STAT. § 19-5-203(t)
[D](II) (2004)).
44. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIc RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
895-905 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing judicial construction and application of statutory standards
governing the involuntary termination of the parental status).
45. 1 HOLLINGER, supra note 29, § 2-10[3], at 2-99.
46. In re Vaughn, No. 04CA06, 2004 WL 2381869 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2004) (applying the Ohio statute currently codified at OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.07 (West 2000)).
47. Id. at *2.
48. See, e.g., In reAdoption of R.W.B., 7 P.3d 306, 310 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000) (applying a state
statute that expressly "allow[ed] the court to disregard incidental visits, contact communications, or
contributions"); I HOLLINGER, supra note 29, § 2.10[3], at 2-103 to -106 (collecting cases).
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even after ruling that statutory grounds exist to terminate the parent's
rights. This result is usually based on the judge's general understanding
that children's interests are best served by continuing a legal connection
to their biological parents. This viewpoint was expressed, for example, in
the Colorado case of In re J.A.A., where the adoption court determined
that the noncustodial father's abandonment of his child for more than
three years constituted grounds for terminating his parental rights. In spite
of this finding, the adoption court refused to terminate the father's rights
and grant the stepparent adoption petition, stating that "it would be in the
best interest of the child to maintain and develop a relationship with his
natural father.",49 The appellate court subsequently ruled that "[this] decision is within the discretion of the trial court."5 ° The exercise of judicial
discretion in this case clearly assigned priority, as between the competing
interests that are present in every stepparent adoption case, to the set of
interests associated with maintaining the noncustodial parent-child relationship.
The category of stepparent adoption cases involves certain special considerations relating to the child's existing placement, which do not arise
in other types of adoption cases. Here the potential adoptive parent (the
stepparent) has been selected for a parenting role by the child's custodial
parent, to whom the care of the child is already entrusted. Furthermore, a
stepparent adoption does not require a new placement for the child who
already resides with the custodial parent and the petitioning stepparent,
and formalizes established relationships within the stepfamily. These special circumstances may influence the exercise of judicial discretion in
contested cases. 5'
49. In re Adoption of J.A.A., 618 P.2d 742, 742 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980).
50. Id. at 743.
51. Stepparent adoptions receive special legal treatment, compared with other categories of
adoption, in certain provisions of the state adoption codes. First, the waiver of consent statutes
in some states include grounds that apply only in stepparent adoption cases. See, e.g., KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 59-2136 (1994) (establishing ground of "fail[ure] or refus[al] to assume the duties of a
parent for two years" in stepparent cases); LA. CHILD CODE ANN. art. 1245 C (2004) (establishing
six-month period of nonsupport or failure to communicate for six months as ground for waiver
of consent in stepparent cases). Furthermore, many state adoption codes authorize the courts to
waive certain procedural requirements, such as financial accounting and home inspection
requirements, in stepparent cases. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-10A-27 (1992) ("Any person may
adopt his or her spouse's child according to the provisions [regulating adoptions], except that...
[n]o investigation ...

shall occur unless otherwise directed by the court, and ...

no report of

fees and charges.., shall be made unless ordered by the court."). See generally UNIF. ADOPTION
Acr supra note 11, at art. 4 cmt. (describing special features of the stepfamily that justify different procedural rules in stepparent adoption cases); 1 HOLLINGER, supra note 29, § 3.02[l][a],
3-10 n.12 (noting that "in some situations a refusal to waive the home-study requirement or an
insistence on a waiting period may be advisable, especially if any doubts are raised about the
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Thus, the special circumstances of the residential stepchild led one
appellate court to conclude that judicial discretion should, as a general
rule, be exercised in favor of stepparent adoption petitions, as follows:
[P]ublic policy favors stepparent adoption because the adoption helps solidify
an already existing family unit consisting of one of the biological parents....
[T]he modem trend is to make stepparent adoption easier .... The conflict
between the best interests of the child and the natural parent's right to parenthood, which can arise in a stepparent adoption... is resolved in Colorado law
52
by placing primary importance on the best interests of the child.

Elsewhere, however, the stability of the stepchild's existing placement
has led to the opposite conclusion, that judges should be less willing to
grant contested adoption petitions in stepparent cases than in other types
of adoption cases. This viewpoint was explained by Professor David
Chambers, as follows:
In any given case, especially one in which the biologic father is protesting, the
judge may well be puzzled whether the child will really be any better off if
adopted. The immediate benefits to the child from permitting the adoption may
be hard to measure-the child is, after all, already living securely with the step53
parent who proposes to adopt.

Some of the benefits that may accrue to the established stepfamily upon
adoption are intangible, such as the symbolic value to family members of
creating a formal legal status between stepparent and child. The formal
change of the stepchild's surname reflects this symbolic shift in many
adoption cases. Furthermore, certain immediate, practical consequences
may flow from the child's changed legal status, such as eligibility for benefits under the adoptive parent's employee benefit programs, and standing
of the adoptive parent to act for the child vis-A-vis third party educators
and medical practitioners. Finally, all of the future consequences of legal
parenthood, such as support responsibility and custodial rights, replace the
uncertain status of the nonadoptive stepparent. Of course, in contested
stepparent adoption cases, the benefit of these changes must be weighed
against the loss of the symbolic and legal connections between the adopted
child and the noncustodial parent.
4
The opinion of the Missouri Court of Appeals in the case of L. v. L.1
quality of the relationship between a child and an actual or prospective stepparent") (citing 1987
report indicating "disproportionate incidence" of abuse and homicide of children by residential
partners of custodial parents).
52. E.R.S. v. O.D.A., 779 P.2d 844, 849-50 (Colo. 1989) (holding that a provision relating
to nonsupport as the basis for termination of parental rights under the Colorado waiver of
parental consent statute should be construed in favor of easier termination).
53. Chambers, supra note 4, at 112.
54. L. v. L., 937 S.W.2d 734 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
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provides more insight than the opinions in many other stepparent adoption
cases about the motivations of the custodial father, the petitioning stepmother, and the noncustodial mother who successfully contested the proposed adoption. Notably, the parties focused on important legal changes that
would take place in the event of the stepmother's adoption of her stepson.
According to the court in L. v. L., the custodial father and stepmother
"both testified that they filed the petition for adoption because they were
concerned about the custody situation if something were to happen to [the
father]."" The stepfamily's concern about the child's future placement
was premised on the fact, conceded by the mother, that she could not
"provide [the child] with an adequate home and care.",5 6 Under general
child custody principles, in the event of a custodial parent's death, a presumption exists that the noncustodial parent has exclusive custodial
rights, and the stepparent has none.57 On the other hand, if the stepmother
in L v. L. adopted her stepchild, the noncustodial mother's rights would be
terminated and, in the event of the father's death, the adoptive stepmother
would enjoy the role of sole surviving parent.
The noncustodial mother in L. v. L. expressed a different legal concern.
Namely, she opposed the proposed stepparent adoption because she did
not want to lose the enforceable right to visit with her son. The court
explained the validity of this concern, as follows: "All agree that it is in
the best interest of [the child] that he maintain the relationship with his
mother. However, once the adoption becomes final that relationship can
continue to exist only upon the option of the adoptive parents."5 8
The adoption court in L. v. L. determined that the noncustodial mother
had "continuously neglected to provide [her child] with necessary care
and protection" for at least six months, which established the ground for
waiving her consent to the proposed adoption. In overruling this determination, the appellate court addressed the parties' respective concerns
55. Id. at. 736.
56. Id. at 736-37.
57. See 1 LINDA D. ELROD, CHILD CUSTODY PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §§ 7:13-14 (2004)
(discussing state laws governing parent versus stepparent custody disputes); Carolyn Wilkes
Kaas, Breaking Up a Family or Putting It Back Together Again: Refining the Preference in
Favor of the Parent in Third-PartyCustody Cases, 37 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1045 (1996) (proposing different standards to govern parent versus stepparent custody disputes depending upon
whether the conflict arises between the custodial parent and stepparent at the time of divorce,
or between the noncustodial parent and stepparent following death of the custodial parent). See
generally Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepfamilies from a Legal Perspective 231, 243-47, in
STEPFAMILIES: HISTORY, RES., AND POL'Y (Irene Levin & Marvin B. Sussman eds., 1997) (noting that the authority of the custodial parent to affect the respective rights of the stepparent and
noncustodial parent by executing a will or other legal document is limited).
58. L. v. L., 937 S.W.2d at 738.
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about the legal consequences of adoption. According to the court, the
stepfamily's concern about the child's future custody "is a valid consideration in a stepparent adoption but we do not find it outweighs the benefits to the child arising from his relationship with his natural mother."'5 9
The specific legal concerns raised by the parties in L. v. L. highlighted
the all-or-nothing nature of adoption law. That is, in order to establish
future custodial rights for the stepmother in L. v. L., the noncustodial
mother's present rights of access had to be terminated. An alternative,
more flexible legal model could be established that would recognize rights
for both the noncustodial parent and the stepparent in appropriate cases.
The most frequently discussed alternative is an "open adoption" law that
would permit the court to enter an enforceable third-party visitation order
for the noncustodial parent whose status is terminated by consent or by
court order prior to adoption.6" In these circumstances, the former parent
with a visitation order entered by the adoption court would enter the ranks
of the "third parties" featured in this symposium.
The all-or-nothing model of adoption, embodied in the state laws discussed in this Part, reflects traditional understandings about family boundaries in the law. Stepparent adoption involves the replacement of one legal
parent figure (the noncustodial parent) with another (the stepparent), thus
reflecting the general principle that legal parenthood, limited to two adults
at one time, must be created by biology or adoption. Furthermore, a court
will grant the stepparent's petition to adopt only if a determination has been
made that grounds exist to terminate the status of the biological parent,
thus illustrating the level of protection extended in the law to the status of
biological parenthood.
VI. The Lack of Uniformity of Stepfamilies Has Slowed the
Development of a Legal Status for Stepparents
Another consideration, relating to the nature of the stepfamily itself,
has contributed to the slow development of "stepfamily law" in nonadop59. Id.
60. See UNIF. ADOPTION Acr supra note 11, at art. 4 (proposing an open adoption model for
stepparent adoption cases), discussed in Margaret M. Mahoney, Open Adoption in Context: The
Wisdom and Enforceability of Visitation Ordersfor Former Parents under Uniform Adoption
Act § 4-113, 51 FLA. L. REV.89 (1999). The drafters' comments state that the visitation provision was included in the act with the intention of encouraging more noncustodial parents to consent to the termination of their parental rights. See art. 4 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 103-04. See also 3
HOLLINGER, supra note 29, § 13.02[31[b] (discussing open adoption by stepparents); Annette R.
Appell, Increasing Options to Improve Permanency: Considerations in Drafting an Adoption
with Contact Statute, 18 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 24, 28-29 (1998) (collecting state open adoption
laws).
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tive stepfamilies. Namely, it is generally understood by lawmakers and
policy analysts that the functional relationships formed between stepparents and their stepchildren vary widely from one family to the next, in
terms of the levels of family connectedness and responsibility. Numerous
empirical studies indicate that the attitudes of stepfamily members toward
each other and the involvement in parenting undertaken by stepparents are
not consistent from one family to the next.6'
Professor David Chambers described the variation among stepparent
roles, and its impact on lawmaking, as follows: "The stepparent relationship, by contrast [to the biological parent role], lacks-and, I would argue,
cannot possibly obtain-a single paradigm or model of appropriate
responsibilities."6 2 Chambers highlighted two factual variables that affect
the roles assumed by stepparents: the age of the child when the stepfamily
is formed and the extent of involvement by the child's noncustodial parent.
But the constant and most significant factor contributing to lack of consistency in stepparent roles, observed by Chambers, was the absence of any
"set of clear norms to guide their behaviors. '63
This perceived lack of consistency among stepfamilies makes their
legal regulation a more complex undertaking than the regulation of traditional families where the assumption of basic uniformity, however erroneous, exists. A one-size-fits-all set of affirmative rights and duties for
residential stepparents toward their stepchildren would be a misfit for too
many of the regulated families. The traditional legal response to this
dilemma is to ignore the stepparent in the family.
A. Nonrecognition of Stepfamilies Is the
Default Position in the Law
The law of inheritance, which governs the distribution of property to
the heirs of an individual who dies without a will, illustrates this traditional approach to stepfamily regulation. The distribution of property in
these circumstances is governed by state intestacy statutes, which list the
property owner's closest family members as heirs. The intestacy statutes
in every state include biological and adopted children and exclude
unadopted stepchildren as heirs. 64
61. See Mary Ann Mason et al., Stepparents: De Facto Parents or Legal Strangers, 23 1.
FAM. ISSUEs 507, 508-09 (2002) (cataloguing empirical work on this topic).
62. Chambers, supra note 4, at 104-05.
63. Id.
64. See Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Law of Succession and Wills, 22 U.C.
DAvis L. REV. 917,917-24 (1989); Kim A. Feigenbaum, Note, The Changing Family Structure:
ChallengingStepchildren'sLack of Inheritance Rights, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 167, 167-83 (2000).
The California intestacy statute is unique in its inclusion of stepchildren and foster children as
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The intestacy statutes establish a one-size-fits-all "estate plan" for
those individuals who fail to tailor their own plan for property distribution
at death by executing a will. The goals of the legislation are to accurately
identify the categories of family members who are the "natural objects of
bounty" of the average decedent, thereby protecting the donative intentions of the property owner and achieving economic fairness within the
family, and to keep simple the process of fitting the statutory model onto
individual family trees.65 Within this framework, the exclusion of
stepchildren implies that they are not likely to be regarded as "natural
objects of bounty" by the average property owner, and that eligibility for
stepchildren might complicate the process of identifying the decedent's
heirs in some cases.
Not surprisingly, compelling cases have emerged where the exclusion
of unadopted stepchildren from inheritance has defeated the intentions of
an individual property owner and produced unfair results.66 In families
where close family ties have formed between stepparent and stepchild,
excluding the stepchild as an heir produces the "wrong" result. Of course,
any one-size-fits-all approach to property distribution inevitably produces
"wrong" results in some cases. Thus, the children of a deceased property
owner may be "undeserving heirs" in this sense, under the rules that
include all biological and adopted children whatever the nature of the parent-child relationship in each case. The premise of the state intestacy
statutes is that donative intent and fair results are most likely to be accomplished in the largest number of cases through the inclusion of biological
and adopted children, but not stepchildren.
An alternative approach to rulemaking would require the case-by-case
evaluation of stepparent-child relationships to determine whether the
heirs, along with the biological and adopted children of the decedent, in certain circumstances.
Few stepchildren are likely to qualify as heirs under the statute, which requires proof that the
"stepparent would have adopted [the child] but for a legal barrier." See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6454
(West Supp. 2006). See generally L.S. Tellier, Annotation, Descent and Distributionfrom
Stepparents to Stepchildren or Vice Versa, 63 A.L.R.2d 303 (1959 & Later Case Serv. 1994)
(collecting stepfamily inheritance cases).
65. See E. Gary Spitko, The Expressive Function of Succession Law and the Merits of NonMarital Inclusion, 41 ARtz. L. REV. 1063, 1068-71, 1076-77 (1999).
66. See, e.g., In re Berge's Estate, 47 N.W.2d 428 (Minn. 1951). In some jurisdictions
stepchildren, along with others who are excluded as heirs under the state intestacy statute, may
inherit under the judicial doctrine of equitable adoption. The standard established under the
equitable doctrine requires proof of a contractual promise by the property owner to adopt the
children, a scenario that exists in very few stepparent inheritance cases. See MAHONEY, supra
note 4, at 60-63; Ralph C. Brashier, Children and Inheritance in the NontraditionalFamily,
1996 UTAH L. REV. 93, 172-74. See generally Tracy Bateman Farrell, Annotation, Modern
Status of Law as to Equitable Adoption or Adoption by Estoppel, 122 A.L.R. 5th 205 (2004)
(summarizing case law not limited to stepfamily cases).
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assignment of legal consequences, such as inheritance rights, would be fair
and appropriate. In the field of inheritance law, the state legislatures have
eschewed this approach67 and maintained an across-the-board rejection of
stepchildren as heirs. In other areas of law, however, the legislatures and
courts in certain states have adopted a more refined approach to regulating stepfamilies.
B. Regulation under the in Loco ParentisDoctrine
The in loco parentis doctrine has been developed and applied by state
legislatures and courts for the purpose of identifying those residential
stepparents (and other adults) who assume an active parental role in the
life of a child, and attaching specific legal consequences to this voluntary
behavior. The in loco parentis doctrine literally requires the stepparent to
demonstrate, through statements and actions, the intention to stand "in the
place of a parent. ' '68 Statutes and common law rules in each state assign
legal consequences to the in loco parentis status in areas such as child support, child custody and visitation, and medical consent for the treatment
of minors.
The in loco parentis doctrine has wide application in the area of child
support. The starting premise in the law of child support is that the two
biological parents, who cause children to enter the world, bear exclusive
financial responsibility for them. Against this backdrop of mandatory
responsibility, the in loco parentis doctrine acknowledges the additional,
voluntary responsibility for stepchildren undertaken by their stepparents.69
Notably, the stepparent support duty arising under the in loco parentis
67. See generally Feigenbaum, supra note 64 (summarizing scholarly proposals for reform
to allow stepchild inheritance).
68. See MAHONEY, supra note 4, at 16-22; 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 346 (2002); Bryce
Levin, Divorce and the Modem Family: Providing in Loco Parentis Stepparents Standing to
Sue for Custody of Their Stepchildren in a Dissolution Proceeding, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 315,

323-26 (1996); Sarah H. Ramsey & Judith M. Masson, Stepparent Support of Stepchildren: A
Comparative Analysis of Policies and Problems in the American and English Experience, 36
SYRACUSE L. REV. 659, 673-74 (1986).

69. The voluntary nature of stepparent support responsibility under the in loco parentis doctrine
highlights an important normative consideration that has helped to shape the law of economic
responsibility for stepchildren. The normative consideration is that family laws should not discourage marriage, especially marriage to single parents whose economic standard of living
along with that of their children might improve upon marriage. See generally Mary Ann Mason
et al., supra note 61, at 509 (referring to empirical studies that document the improved economic
position of children upon marriage of their single parent). Within this framework, a perception has
long existed that compulsory economic responsibility for stepchildren might discourage individual decisions to marry custodial parents. See, e.g., Van Dyke v. Thompson, 630 P.2d 420,
423 (Wash. 1981) (opining that a broad construction of the state stepparent support statute, which
would extend support duties to nonresidential stepparents, "would be contrary to... compelling
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doctrine terminates upon the end of the stepparent's marriage to the child's
70
custodial parent.
During the ongoing marriage, the practical significance of a stepparent
support obligation involves third parties,7 ' such as creditors who provided
items necessary for the support of the stepchild and thereafter seek payment
from the stepparent. 72 Another category of persons outside the stepfamily
who may be interested in the existence of stepparent support obligations
consists of noncustodial parents who owe support to minor children residing
in stepfamilies. As a general rule, however, the existence of a stepparent
support duty has not been regarded by judges in child support cases as a
basis for relieving the noncustodial parent of responsibility.73
The common law in loco parentis doctrine developed in the state courts
public policies: It would discourage marriage."). The assumption reflected here about how individuals make marriage decisions is subject to debate. See Margaret M. Mahoney, Forces
Shaping the Law of Cohabitationfor Opposite Sex Couples, 7 J. LAW & FAM. STUD. 135, 17382 (discussing the potential impact of family laws on marriage decisions); Mason et al., supra,
at 516 (reporting on a survey of twenty-seven married couples with stepchildren in which
"[n]one of them said legal considerations played a significant role in their decision to marry,
although a few had discussed the issue"); Chambers, supra note 4, at 128 ("I am uncertain what
the effects of [a law imposing post-divorce support duties] would be on people's willingness to
enter into marriages with custodial parents.").
70. See Ramsey & Masson, supra note 68, at 674. The courts in some states recognize an
equitable exception to the general rule of automatic termination of stepparent support obligations
upon divorce, under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. See MAHONEY, supra note 4, at 31-38. The
circumstances of many stepfamilies do not fulfill the specific requirements of the doctrine. See
David B. Sweet, Annotation, Stepparent'sPostdivorceDuty to SupportStepchild, 44 A.L.R. 4th
520 § 5 (2006) (collecting cases). Thus, the commentary accompanying the American Law
Institute's model support statute emphasizes the rarity of successful stepchild estoppel claims:
This section does not impose a general stepparent duty of support that survives dissolution of the domestic relationship of a child's parent and stepparent .... A person who
marries someone who already has a child from a prior relationship necessarily shares
resources with ... the child during the marriage. This sharing alone is an insufficient
basis for imposing a support obligation that survives the relationship of the adult parties.
However, in rare cases a stepparent's affirmative behavior should equitably estop the
stepparent from disclaiming a support obligation after the termination of the stepparent's
marriage to the child's parent.
AM.

LAW

INST.,

PRINCIPLES

OF THE LAW

OF FAMILY

DISSOLUTION:

ANALYSIS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS § 303 cmt. b, at 416 (2002) (emphasis added).
71. The family privacy doctrine generally disallows direct suit between family members for
support in the intact family. See, e.g., McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 1956) (denying wife's claim to support from husband).
72. See Margaret M. Mahoney, Support and Custody Aspects of the Stepparent-Child
Relationship,70 CORNELL L. REV. 38, 42 n.25 (1984) (collecting cases in which creditors recovered payment from stepparents under the in loco parentis theory).
73. See MAHONEY, supra note 4, at 41-45; Laura W. Morgan, The Rights, Duties and
Responsibilitiesof Stepparents to Their Stepchildren, 8 DIVORCE LITIG. 165, 173-76 (1996). The
Missouri legislature has codified the rule described in the text. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.400(1)
(2000) ("[N]othing in [the stepparent support statute] shall be construed as abrogating or in any
way diminishing the duty a parent otherwise would have to provide child support ....).
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is not limited to stepparents. Other adults who assume responsible roles in
the lives of children may also receive recognition for various legal purposes,
including child support, because they stand "in the place of a parent." By
way of contrast, a number of state legislatures have codified the in loco
parentis doctrine for the purpose of imposing support obligations exclusively upon residential stepparents.74
By distinguishing those residential stepfamilies where the actual roles
played by family members warrant legal regulation, the in loco parentis
doctrine is designed to produce more just results than the traditional laws
that deny recognition to all stepparents. The more tailored approach, however, involves well-understood costs for family members and for the legal
system, relating to the uncertainty and expense incurred under a rule
requiring case-by-case application.75
C. A Third Approach to Rulemaking Recognizes
All Residential Stepparents
A scattering of state statutes, primarily in the fields of child support and
postdivorce visitation, avoid the necessity of case-by-case determinations
by extending legal recognition to all residential stepparents without regard
to the role of the stepparent in the stepfamily. For example, the support
statute in Missouri provides that "[a] stepparent shall support his or her
stepchild to the same extent that a natural or adoptive parent is required to
support his or her child so long as the stepchild is living in the same home
as the stepparent. "76 As under the in loco parentis doctrine, stepparent
support responsibility arising under this broader type of support doctrine
terminates with the marriage that created the duty.77
74. See MONT.CODE ANN. § 40-6-217 (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-09 (2004); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 15 (West 1998). See also HAW. REV. STAT. § 577-4 (LexisNexis 1999)
(limiting the support burden on stepparents standing in loco parentis to families in which the
parents are unable to support the child).
75. See generally Levin, supra note 68, at 329 (making "A Proposal for Ensuring Certainty
in in Loco Parentis Determinations" in stepparent custody cases). The concern about the lack of
certainty associated with laws that require case-by-case determinations pervades the family law
system. See Carl E. Schneider, The Tension Between Rules and Discretion in Family Law: A
Report and Reflection, 27 FAM. L.Q. 229 (1993).
76. Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.400 (2000). See also IOWA CODE ANN.§ 252A-2, -3 (West Supp.
2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 546-A:l, :2 (LexisNexis 1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.053
(Supp. 1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-7-8 (1999); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.205 (2005).
Other state statutes similarly omit the requirement of an active or in loco parentis role on the
part of the stepparent, but limit liability to cases where the parents are unable to provide support, see DEL. CODE ANN.tit. 13, § 501 (1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 296 (2002), or the child
is receiving public assistance, see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.310 (LexisNexis 1998); N.Y.
Soc. SERV. LAW § 101 (McKinney 2003).
77. See 3 ARNOLD H. RuTKiN, FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE § 33.02[f] (2005). But see supra
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The primary downside of this third approach to stepfamily regulation is
overbreadth. In enacting the support statute quoted above, the Missouri
legislature chose to disregard the concerns raised by empirical data about
the range of attitudes and roles assumed by people living in stepfamilies.
The legislation treats all residential stepparents alike, and just like biological
and adoptive families, for the purpose of the support statute. In this legal
environment, the support responsibility of a parent can be established by
procreation, by adoption, or by marriage to and residence with the custodial
parent of a minor child.
D. The Law of Stepparent Visitation Illustratesthe Various
Approaches to Law-making for Stepfamilies
The issue of stepparent visitation at the time of divorce, like the child
support issue described above, is governed by state laws that take a wide
range of approaches to stepfamily regulation. To begin, the traditional
common law rule establishes custody and visitation rights exclusively for
legal parents, and generally denies standing to stepparents and other third
parties to seek judicial visitation orders.78 The denial of legal recognition
to the stepparent in this context enhances the authority of the custodial
parent to make decisions for the child, including decisions about access to
other persons. This traditional rule continues as the default rule governing
stepfamily visitation disputes in some jurisdictions.7 9
In recent decades, a number of state courts and legislatures have broken
with this tradition by establishing the right to petition for judicial visitation
orders for certain categories of nonparents, including stepparents. The thirdparty visitation laws attempt to balance the interests of the parent and the
child associated with parental authority, against the competing interests
arising out of the child's established relationships with other family members. In the words of the United States Supreme Court:
The States' nonparental visitation statutes are ... supported by a recognition...
that children should have the opportunity to benefit from relationships with
statutorily specified persons .... The extension of statutory rights ... comes
with an obvious cost ....
[A]n independent third-party interest in a child can
place a substantial burden on the traditional parent-child relationship. 8°
note 70 (discussing doctrine of equitable estoppel, which creates an exception to the general rule
that stepparent support duties automatically terminate upon divorce).
78. 3 CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION § 16.12[2] (Sandra Morgan Little ed., 2005).
79. Id.
80. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 64 (2000) (ruling that the Washington state third-party
visitation statute, as applied by the trial court to resolve a grandparent visitation dispute in
Troxel, was unconstitutional).
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As applied in the stepfamily, the third-party visitation laws enable the
stepparent, usually at the time of divorce from the custodial parent, to seek
to establish an enforceable right to continue seeing the child in spite of the
parent's objections. 8
Under the legislative model implemented in some states, all stepparents
have standing to seek a visitation order. 82 Elsewhere, the state visitation
statutes limit standing to stepparents (and sometimes other individuals)
who stand in loco parentis to the stepchild or otherwise enjoy a meaningful
family relationship with the child. 3 The South Dakota visitation statute
spells out this limitation, stating that stepparents do not have standing to
seek visitation "merely because the stepparent was married to or living with
the child's parent."8 4 Nationwide, these various visitation laws reflect the
81. See MAHONEY, supra note 4, at 129-37; John DeWitt Gregory, Defining the Family in
the Millennium: The Troxel Follies, 32 U. MEM. L. REV. 687, 689-93 (2002). The stepparent
may seek a visitation order at other times of family transition, such as the death of the custodial parent when primary custody of the child shifts to the noncustodial parent or another relative.
See 3 LITTLE, supra note 78, § 16.12[2]. Furthermore, stepparents may vie for primary physical
and legal custody of the stepchild, either at the time of divorce or upon death of the custodial
parent. The issue of standing and the substantive standards applied in stepparent custody cases
are beyond the scope of this article. See generally sources cited supra note 57.
82. The visitation statutes in a number of states include stepparents under an umbrella provision that authorizes visitation petitions by "any person." See ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.060(a)
(2000) ("grandparent or other person"); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-59 (West 2004) ("any
person"); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-46(7) (LexisNexis 1999) ("any person interested in the
welfare of the child"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1653(2)(B) (1998) ("a third person");
Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.375(5)(a) (Supp. 2004) ("any other person" [besides the parents]); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 40-4-228 (2003) ("third party"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.240(1) (West
2005) ("[a] person other than a parent").
In other jurisdictions, the unrestricted category of stepparents is specifically included in the
visitation statute. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3101(a) (West 2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1616(b)
(2005); LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 136(B) (Supp. 2005) ("a relative, by blood or affinity, or a former stepparent or stepgrandparent"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-303(a) (2001); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-124.1, .2 (2004 & Supp. 2005); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.245(1) (West 2001). The Ohio visitation statute does not mention stepparents, but extends standing to "any person related to the
child by consanguinity or affinity, or any other person other than a parent." OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3109.051(B)(1) (West 2005) (emphasis added).
83. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-415[C], [D] (2000) ("a person other than a legal parent...
[if the person] stands in loco parentis to the child"); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119 (Supp. 1998)
("any person, including but not limited to a... stepparent ....who has established emotional
ties creating a child-parent relationship or an ongoing personal relationship with a child"); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-29 (Supp. 2003) ("any person other than the parent of a child with whom
he or she has served as a primary caretaker, has closely bonded as a parental figure, or has otherwise formed a significant and substantial relationship").
84. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-31 (Supp. 2003). Even in the absence of such legislative
guidance, the courts ruling on stepparent requests for visitation have sometimes imposed the
same in loco parentis limitation on standing. See, e.g., Carter v. Brodrick, 644 P.2d 850 n.5
(Alaska 1982); 3 LrrrLE, supra note 78, § 16.12[2][c]; Gregory, supra note 81, at 692 ("The
rationale that courts have relied on most frequently in granting visitation rights to stepparent is
the in loco parentis doctrine ....).
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same three approaches to stepfamily regulation described above in the context of stepparent support duties during marriage: first, nonrecognition;
second, recognition for all residential stepparents; and third, recognition
only for stepparents who stand in loco parentis to their stepchildren.
Notably, the "overbreadth" concern raised by the support statutes that
apply across the board to all stepparents is alleviated to some extent in the
visitation context under the statutes that confer standing on all stepparents.
Specifically, all of the state visitation statutes require a court to address
the stepparent visitation petition in each case, to determine whether visitation
would be in the best interests of the child or would satisfy some other substantive standard. The alternative statutory standards are generally stricter
than the best interests of the child standard requiring, for example, proof
85
that visitation by the stepparent is necessary to prevent harm to the child.
These substantive requirements, like the in loco parentis requirement built
into the standing provisions of certain visitation statutes, operate to screen
out the claims of stepparents whose level of involvement with the child
does not warrant legal recognition.
E. An Alternative Approach to Legal Regulation:
A Registration System for Stepparents
An alternative approach to regulating stepparents under the law would
employ a voluntary registration system for residential stepparents who
desire formal recognition of their status. The participation of the stepparent's spouse, the custodial parent, would be a necessary element of the
stepparent registration procedure. In recent years, domestic partnership
registration systems have been established at both the local and state levels
in the United States and in other nations, as a means for creating legally
85. See LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 136 (B) (Supp. 2005) ("Under extraordinary circumstances
a... former stepparent... may be granted reasonable visitation rights if the court finds that it
is in the best interest of the child."); Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.375(5)(a) (Supp. 2004) ("When the
court finds that each parent is unfit, unsuitable, or unable to be a custodian, or the welfare of the
child requires, and it is in the best interests of the child, then custody ... or visitation may be
awarded to any other person ....
); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119 (Supp. 1998) (subjecting best
interests of the child standard to a "presumption that the legal parent acts in the best interest of
the child" in visitation cases); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-303(a) (2001) (requiring "that such
stepparent is actually providing or contributing towards the support of such child").
See also AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 2.18(2)(c) (2002)

(authorizing third-party visitation or custody only if "the available alternatives would cause
harm to the child"); Martin Guggenheim, The Making of the Model Third-Party(Non-Parental)
Contact Statute: The Reporter's Perspective, 18 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW 15, 32 (2002)
(describing standard under the Academy's model statute, which would require proof "that the
child would suffer a serious loss if contact were not awarded and that the parent's denial of contact was unreasonable and not in the child's best interest").
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significant status relationships between adults. 86 No similar system of volun87
tary registration has been established in the United States for stepparents.
The state legislatures have felt no pressure from stepfamilies, analogous
to the lobbying efforts on behalf of adult domestic partners, to establish a
comprehensive legal status for stepparents. The category of stepfamilies
who may be dissatisfied with the current state of the law is not an organized
88
or vocal group.
The crucial decision for lawmakers in establishing such a system would
involve the selection of rights and duties for the "registered stepparent"
status. A voluntary status would likely be most attractive to stepparents if
legal benefits were emphasized. For example, the creation of custodial
authority during the stepparent's marriage and a right to petition for visitation with the child thereafter would predictably attract more registrants
than the creation of support obligations. On the other hand, lawmakers
(presumably the state legislatures) might determine that the stepparent
status should be defined to include economic responsibility, including
postdivorce support duties, along with certain benefits of parenthood.
Even if fewer stepparents signed up, they would likely be individuals who
took seriously their role in the child's life, both present and future.
This type of approach to defining family status relationships has the
benefit of certainty for both family members and members of the public
who deal with them. The formal registration procedure would leave no
doubt about the identity of those residential stepparents who were entitled
to legal recognition. Furthermore, the consequences of entering the status
of registered stepparent would be clearly stated and understood. On the
other hand, the major downside to a self-selecting system of legal regulation would be the exclusion from legal recognition, protection, and responsibility for those who failed to register.89
86. See LESLIE J. HARRIS ET AL., FAMILY LAW 267-76 (3d ed. 2005) (collecting state domestic partnership laws); William C. Duncan, Domestic PartnershipLaws in the United States: A
Review and Critique, 2001 BYU L. REv. 961, 963, 965 (reporting on thirty-five municipal
domestic partnership laws in the United States); Stonewall, Countries That Recognise or
Proposed to Recognise Same-Sex Relationships, available at http//www.stonewall.org.uk
(listing jurisdictions worldwide with domestic partnership laws extending to same-sex and/or
opposite-sex couples).
87. English law provides for the creation of a legal status for the residential stepparent, with
the participation of the custodial parent, by agreement or court order. See CHILDREN AcT, 1989,
§ 12, amended by ADOPTION AND CHILDREN AcT, 2002, c.38, § 212 (Eng.), discussed in 3
EUROPEAN FAMILY LAW IN ACTION 392 (Katharina Boele-Woelki et al. eds., 2005).
88. See Chambers, supra note 4, at Ill ("The small changes in the law [that extend legal
recognition to stepparents] have not been due to lobbying efforts by stepparents themselves, for
they are not a well-organized political force in this country.").
89. See generally Mahoney, supra note 69, at 185-87 (assessing merits of the registration
model for defining a legal status for unmarried, opposite-sex couples).
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The creation of a registration system for stepparents would function as
an alternative to the present system of lawmaking for nonadoptive, residential stepparents, which involves the various legislative and judicial
approaches described in this Part. The wide range of approaches to defining stepparent rights and obligations, in areas such as child support and
visitation, reflects a reluctance to make blanket assumptions, like those
made about traditional nuclear families, that all stepfamilies are alike for
the purposes of legal regulation. This factor helps to explain the absence
of a comprehensive and consistent definition of stepparent-child relationships in the law.
VII. Conclusion
As described earlier in this article, the legal recognition and regulation
of nonadoptive, residential stepparents has occurred on an issue-by-issue
basis within the legislatures and courts of each state. This process has
produced an irregular pattern of regulation for stepfamilies in the United
States.
For many family-law purposes, such as family inheritance rights, the
stepparent-child relationship receives no recognition. For other family-law
purposes, stepparents have received recognition as "third parties," whose
interests must be reconciled with the primary interests of the stepchild's
legal parents. Often, such recognition is extended only if the residential
stepparent meets a standard, such as the in loco parentis standard, involving proof of an established, parent-like relationship with the child. This
type of treatment appears, for example, in some of the state laws governing stepparent support responsibility during the period of marriage to the
stepchild's custodial parent, and the laws establishing stepparent standing
to seek visitation following termination of the marriage. The recognition
of third-party claims by residential stepparents in this manner has caused
a limited shift in the established boundaries of family in the law.
Under the law of stepparent adoption, the adoptive stepparent takes the
place of the noncustodial parent whose parental rights have been legally
terminated. Here, the stepparent ceases to be a third party and assumes full
parental status vis-A-vis the adopted stepchild. The resulting adoptive
family falls within the traditional boundaries of family, involving a child
and two biological or adoptive parents.
The large majority of residential stepparents do not adopt their minor
stepchildren. The analysis of family issues in the nonadoptive stepfamily
and the formulation of limited, third-party rights and obligations for stepparents, is an important piece of the family law picture in the new millennium. Confronted with this large category of nontraditional families, the
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legal system has reaffirmed the primacy of biological and adoptive parenthood. At the same time, the boundaries of family have been adjusted,
in particular jurisdictions for particular legal purposes, to recognize and
regulate stepfamilies.

